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ABSTRACT: Recent studies find motivated reasoning in citizens’ processing of information 
about public performance. Using experiments in the US and Denmark, we 
examine effects on an accuracy-based task of two forms of motivated reasoning: partisan 
identity-based reasoning and reasoning from ideology-based governance preferences 
(favoring either the public or the private sector). The experiments incorporate 
a political prime, a health care needs prime (to reduce politicization), and a neutral, 
no-prime, condition. We find that priming citizens to think politically accentuates the 
influence of partisan identities and governance preferences on reasoning. In contrast, 
priming about the need for a service reduces these biases. These findings extend 
knowledge of motivated reasoning in an accuracy-based task and priming with a noprime 
benchmark, and confirm some findings of previous studies. Reducing the salience 
of partisan identities or governance preferences in the presentation of information 





The performance movement in government rests in part on the view that providing 
citizens with factual information about the performance of public programs 
and services will facilitate an informed citizenry, enhance democratic accountability, 
and build public trust in government (Boyne et al. 2003; Heinrich 2003; Hatry 
2006). However, recent studies from Denmark suggest that citizens often infer false 
conclusions from unambiguous information about the performance of public and 
private agencies, depending on their prior preferences for public over private service 
provision (Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2016; Baekgaard et al. 2019). This is an 
example of motivated reasoning, which refers to the role of motivations or goals in 
shaping how people attend to and process information. In a US study James and 
Van Ryzin (2017b) found that citizens, when primed to think politically rather 
than about their need for health care services, exhibited more partisan bias in their 
choice of performance indicators and ratings of the strength of evidence about the 
performance of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), also known as Obamacare. Taken 
together, these studies from different country contexts suggest that citizens are 
prone to selective use, differential rating of evidence strength, and errors in processing 
performance information in the presence of ideological or political cues. The 
previous studies are valuable in establishing evidence of these two forms of motivated 
reasoning but employed different designs and thus leave important questions 
about the generalizability of the observed effects unanswered. 
Specifically, the effects of priming people to think politically or about their need for 
a service when undertaking an accuracy-based use of performance information are 
unknown. The James and Van Ryzin (2017b) study established that priming people to 
think nonpolitically, by making them focus on their need for a public service (health 
care), reduced the importance of motivated reasoning as measured by respondents’ 
choice of performance indicators and their ratings of evidence strength. The current 
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study asks if this effect extends further to an accuracy-based task where there is clearly a 
“correct” answer to a question using provided information. This task was used in the 
Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) study and is an important measure of motivated reasoning 
because it unambiguously shows whether people arrive at a correct decision or 
not (Kahan 2013). Additionally, the current study uses a neutral, no-prime condition in 
addition to the political prime and health care needs primes used by James and Van 
Ryzin (2017b). Including a no-prime condition helps clarify whether the political prime 
triggers directional motives (bias) or, in contrast, the health care needs prime promotes 
accuracy motives, extending knowledge through comparisons with a neutral benchmark 
condition. Finally, in addition to the accuracy-based task used by Baekgaard and 
Serritzlew (2016), the current study asks participants to assess the strength of evidence 
after undertaking the accuracy-based task. This measure of evidence strength provides 
insight into participants’ views of the information presented to them and, as such, represents 
an indicator of how motivated reasoning operates as a cognitive process. 
We begin with an overview of the theory and current evidence about motivated 
reasoning, in particular with respect to performance information. We then describe 
a new set of experiments in the US and Denmark that combine and extend elements 
of the prior studies and that assess the role of motivated reasoning in citizens’ 
judgments of performance information in very different country contexts. We 
next present our findings that motivated reasoning of both kinds (based on partisan 
identities and governance preferences) influences accuracy judgments and associated 
assessments of evidence strength, although the results are mixed and not 
entirely consistent with the prior studies. Finally, we draw some conclusions and 
set out the implications for research and practice. 
MOTIVATED REASONING ABOUT PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
A widespread assumption in research and contemporary policy is that performance 
measurement and reporting corrects information deficits among citizens and 
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consumers. This feature of performance information has encouraged reformers to 
create systems of public performance reporting that have become integral and 
important in many developed democracies (Boyne et al. 2003; Hatry 2006). In this 
way, performance information is assumed to contribute to better knowledge about 
public services. However, recent evidence reveals several biases in citizens’ search, 
reception, and use of performance information (Olsen 2013; 2015; Andersen and 
Hjortskov 2015; Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2016, 2019; James and Van Ryzin 
2017b; Baekgaard et al. 2019; James, Jilke, and Van Ryzin 2017). An important 
strand of this research focuses on the role of political biases, especially forms of 
politically or ideologically motivated reasoning about performance information 
(Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2016; James and Van Ryzin 2017b). 
Motivated reasoning recognizes the fact that reasoning is not always rational 
but often driven by desires or preferences that, in the words of Kunda (1990), 
“affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes—that is, 
strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.” In line with prior 
research (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; 
Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2016; James and Van Ryzin 2017b), we distinguish 
between two broad categories of goals. Accuracy goals motivate individuals to 
“seek out and carefully consider relevant evidence so as to reach a correct or otherwise 
best conclusion”. Directional goals, in contrast, motivate people to “apply 
their reasoning powers in defense of a prior, specific conclusion” (Taber and 
Lodge 2006, p. 756). Thus, directional goals refer to situations in which a “person 
is motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion” (Kunda 1999, p. 236). For 
example, motivated reasoning can entail people engaging in confirmation bias to 
seek out new evidence that is consistent with their pre-existing views or disconfirmation 
bias in trying to find fault with evidence inconsistent with their prior views 
(Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Taber and Lodge 2006). 
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We consider two sources of motivated reasoning that are especially relevant to 
the provision of information about government performance. The first is the 
motivation to remain consistent with one’s party identification, following an 
approach in political psychology applied by Taber and Lodge (2006). Citizens’ 
identification with political parties exerts a powerful influence on how they perceive 
and reason about the social and political world (e.g., Druckman, Peterson, 
and Slothuus 2013; Bolsen et al. 2014). Thus, partisanship serves as a potent perceptual 
screen (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 133), leading partisans to perceive the same 
reality differently and to reject new information which is inconsistent with their 
desires and beliefs (Lodge and Taber 2013). In the context of government performance, 
which is characterized by often controversial debates over the content, shape, 
and scope of major public services (James and Van Ryzin 2017b), partisan identity 
becomes especially important in public opinion formation. Thus, the drive to 
remain loyal to one’s own party and to articulate differences with opposing parties 
is likely to activate directional motivated reasoning (Bolsen et al. 2014). 
Consistent with this proposition, a study by James (2011) found that citizens 
who voted for the party controlling a local government were more influenced by 
positive information about the public services it provided than were citizens who 
did not vote for the party in power. Relatedly, Van Ryzin (2013) found that political 
conservatives were especially sensitive to being primed about their expectations 
concerning local government performance compared to moderates and especially 
liberals, which may be attributable to the more negative baseline attitudes 
of conservatives towards government. Likewise, a related stream of literature 
shows that partisans attribute responsibility for economic crisis selectively depending 
on whether they support the government or not (Bisgaard 2015; Tilley and 
Hobolt 2011). 
A clear piece of evidence for partisan-motivated reasoning about performance 
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information comes from a study by James and Van Ryzin (2017b) of how citizens 
process performance information about the ACA. The ACA remains the object of 
intense disagreement between Democrats, who generally support the ACA, and 
Republicans, who have worked to overturn the act (Jacobs and Skocpol 2012). 
This partisan divide was evident when citizens were asked to choose indicators, 
or evaluate statements, about state-level indicators of the performance of the 
US health care system, and the divide was amplified under a political 
prime compared to a health care needs prime. Since President Trump’s election, the 
debate over the ACA has become even more politicized as Republicans have made 
various attempts to “repeal and replace” the ACA along strictly partisan lines. 
The second form of motivated reasoning relates to people’s governance preferences, 
specifically their views regarding the roles of the public and private sectors 
in service delivery. Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) found evidence of this form of 
motivated reasoning by citizens in the context of Danish health care. Baekgaard 
et al. (2019) replicated and extended these findings to politicians. Preferences about 
government (vs. private) service delivery may be linked to deeply held beliefs and 
identities rooted in people’s experiences with the public or private sectors, thus 
influencing their views about the different goals of public and private organizations 
and, in turn, their performance (Christensen et al. 2018). Indeed, in a study focused 
on hospitals and schools, Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) found that governance 
4 International Public Management Journal Vol. 0, No. 0, 2019 
preferences about public versus private service provision affected whether participants 
made correct interpretations of unambiguous performance information. 
Specifically, they found that participants in their experiments tended to perceive 
their preferred type of organization (public or private) as performing better, independent 
of what the unambiguous information suggested. 
PRIMING AND MOTIVATED REASONING 
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Our current study extends the examination of priming effects to an accuracybased 
task involving performance information. James and Van Ryzin (2017b, with 
reference to Higgins (1996) and Kay and Ross (2003):199), previously used priming 
in their experiment, defined as selective activation of “the cognitive accessibility of 
some concepts above others.” In the context of government performance, a prime 
aimed at activating directional reasoning may create selective attention on partisan 
conflicts and reinforce bias in interpretations and processing of performance information. 
In contrast, a prime aimed at activating accuracy goals may attenuate bias 
by focusing people’s minds on accurate and neutral processing. James and Van 
Ryzin’s (2017b) study of the ACA found that citizens who were primed to think 
about politics engaged in stronger partisan-biased processing of information from 
real reports about the performance of the ACA. In contrast, when primed to think 
about their own health care needs, partisan-biased processing of information 
appeared to be reduced. Thus, partisan motivated reasoning was stimulated when 
citizens were primed to think politically, while accuracy goals were more prevalent 
when citizens were primed to think about their own health care needs. The political 
prime widened the gap between Republicans’ and Democrats’ judgments of the 
strength of evidence favorable to the ACA, with Republicans rating it as less 
strong. Additionally, Republicans’ choice of less favorable performance indicators 
from an array, relative to those chosen by Democrats, was intensified under the 
political prime. In contrast, the political prime did not increase partisan differences 
in rating the strength of evidence of unfavorable statements about the Act. 
Motivated reasoning by Republicans seemed primarily related to their being 
relatively unwilling to view favorable evidence about the ACA as strong evidence 
under the political prime. 
In the current study, we extend the study of priming to examine priming effects 
relative to a neutral, no-prime condition. This enables us to examine outcomes 
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from political priming and health priming compared not only to each other but 
also to the outcomes of decision making that occurs more naturally when people 
are not primed in either way. Moreover, we assess effects for both of the two main 
existing versions of motivated reasoning in the literature, namely partisan identities 
and governance preferences. To do so, we conduct new experiments in the US and 
Denmark that extend knowledge beyond findings that have already established the 
relevance of partisan identities and governance preferences as forms of motivated 
reasoning in these contexts. Specifically, the experiment in the US focuses on partisan- 
motivated reasoning, while the experiment in Denmark focuses on governance 
preferences as the basis for motivated reasoning. In line with James and Van Ryzin 
(2017b), we use a political prime consisting of a series of survey questions about 
political ideology and the role of government that aims to induce reasoning along 
political lines. The health care needs prime consists of a series of questions about 
participants’ health and health care needs that aims to stimulate accuracy-based 
motivations stemming from their real-life needs for health services. 
AIMS AND EXPECTATIONS 
In the US experiment, we examine partisan-motivated reasoning in an accuracybased 
task about the performance of the ACA. We expect a relationship for partisan 
identity and assessments of health plans labeled as being part of the ACA, 
with Democrats tending to be more favorable to the plan labeled as being part of 
the ACA and Republicans being more favorable to the performance of the plan 
labeled as being employer-provided (and thus not part of the ACA). 
As mentioned, in the experiment in Denmark, we examine motivated reasoning 
based on governance preferences. We contrast a neutral frame with a politicized 
frame to present information about a comparison between public and private hospitals. 
Our expectation is that the politicized frame activates ideologically based 
motivated reasoning based on citizens’ governance preferences, which reduces the 
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accuracy of assessments of performance. 
The current literature on motivated reasoning only gives limited insight into the 
processes involved when people think about the performance information given to 
them. In order to examine how people think when undertaking the accuracy-based 
task, we asked participants to rate the information provided in terms of its strength 
as evidence about the performance of the organizations. Our expectation is that 
information not consistent with partisan identities or governance preferences will 
be rated as less strong evidence by experimental participants. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHOD1 
Figure 1 shows the design of our two experiments to test these expectations. The 
Denmark experiment focused on motivated reasoning associated with governance 
preferences for public- versus private-sector service provision. Based on the study 
by Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016), we measure governance preferences at the outset, 
prior to randomization. Governance preferences are measured by the following 
questions (using a five-point agree-disagree scale): 
Do you disagree or agree with the following statements? 
1. Many public activities could be produced both better and cheaper by private 
providers. 
2. We should to a larger degree contract out public services (such as child care, 
elderly care, and hospital treatments). 
3. The public sector is best at providing public services. 
The index of governance preferences runs from 0 to 100, with higher values 
denoting a preference for public service provision. We included a series of washout 
questions (on music preferences) after the governance preferences questions so 
as to minimize potential priming effects of these questions. 
The US study instead focused on partisan-motivated reasoning, asking respondents 
for their party-political affiliations using the same method as James and Van 
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Ryzin (2017b). Using standard questions asked by the Pew Center (2014), this 
method classified participants as either Democrats or Republicans based on their 
self-identification as well as how they voted in the last US presidential election. 
Figure 1. Experimental design. 
In both Denmark and the US, we included the politics and health care primes 
from the experiment by James and Van Ryzin (2017b), along with a no-prime 
control condition. The political prime consisted of a 10-point, left-right scale 
of political views followed by a series of forced choice questions on the role of 
government from a Pew Center (2014) poll about political polarization in the 
US. Specifically, the questions asked respondents to choose the statement that 
comes closest to their views: 
_ (a) government often does a better job than people give it credit for; or (b) 
government is almost always wasteful and inefficient; 
_ (a) government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest; 
(b) government regulation of business usually does more harm than 
good; and 
_ (a) poor people have hard lives because government benefits don’t go far 
enough to help them live decently; or (b) poor people today have it easy 
because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return. 
Respondents were also asked the following question: Do you think it is the 
responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health care 
coverage, or is that not the responsibility of the federal government? The purpose 
of these five political priming questions was to activate associations related to 
political ideology and the role of government, immediately in advance of their 
consideration of the performance information. 
For the Danish respondents, the political priming questions were modified to fit 
the Danish political and health care contexts in order to make them relevant and 
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meaningful to participants. The same 10-point, left-right political ideology question 
as in the US experiment was asked. Next, the following statements and questions 
were used in Denmark: 
_ (a) Government often does a better job than people give it credit for; (b) 
government is almost always wasteful and inefficient. 
_ (a) Government regulation of business is necessary; (b) government regulation 
of business usually does more harm than good 
_ (a) Social welfare beneficiaries have easy lives because they can receive public 
benefits without doing anything in return; (b) Social welfare beneficiaries 
have hard lives because the public benefits are too small to support a proper 
standard of living. 
_ (a) Do you think that the public sector should pay for treatments of citizens at 
private hospitals? (Yes, the public sector should pay for treatments at private 
hospitals; No, the public sector should not pay for treatments at private 
hospitals). 
The health care prime, for US respondents, involved a set of questions from 
a Kaiser Family Foundation/NBC News (2014) poll about people’s concerns 
about access to and affordability of health care. Specifically, they were asked how 
worried they are (from 1¼not at all worried, to 4¼very worried) about the following: 
_ having to pay more for health care or health insurance, 
_ not being able to afford needed health services, 
_ not being able to afford needed prescription drugs, 
_ being locked in a job for fear of losing health benefits, and 
_ losing health insurance coverage. 
Participants were also asked to rate your own health these days on a five-point 
scale from 1¼poor to 5¼excellent. The aim of these six health care priming questions 
was to activate associations related to personal concerns about health and the 
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need for health care, again in advance of considering the performance information. 
For the Danish respondents, these items were modified to make them relevant to 
the Danish health care context. The following statements were used: 
_ having a good hospital close to my home, 
_ having access to good surgeons, 
_ having access to the newest medical equipment 
_ not being able to afford the medicine I need 
_ that error may occur during hospitalization 
The main outcome measured in both experiments was an accuracy task based 
on the study by Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016), sometimes referred to as a 
covariance detection task (Kahan et al. 2017). Figure 2 presents the tasks, which 
involved the interpretation of a basic 2_2 table of frequencies. For the Danish 
experiment, as in the study by Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016), participants 
were asked to interpret information about performance outcomes for surgical 
operations. The table enables participants to compare the ratio of hospital 
patients who experienced a positive outcome (operation with no complications) 
to those who experienced a negative one (operation with complications). In one 
treatment arm, these ratios are labeled to present the information as being about 
a public hospital compared to a private hospital. This enables participants to 
calculate ratios of operations with/without complications for the private hospital 
and to compare it with the ratio of operations with/without complications for 
the public hospital. Comparing these ratios allows participants to decide which 
hospital, public or private, is performing better. In each case in Figure 2, the 
correct answer is to choose the bottom row. In the hospital case, the odds of 
an operation without complications are over 5 to 1 in the private hospital, in 
contrast to only 3 to 1 odds of a successful outcome of this kind in the public 
hospital in the top row. 
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In the other treatment arm for the Danish hospital experiment, as shown in 
Figure 2, identical information about the outcomes of operations with and without 
complications was presented. However, the hospitals in the rows were “unlabeled”, 
Figure 2. Performance information (as presented to participants). 
in the sense of being neutrally described as Hospital A compared to Hospital B, in 
order not to invoke public/private sector governance preferences. This experimental 
design enables the accuracy of participants in the labeled (public/private hospital) 
task to be compared with the accuracy of participants in the unlabeled (hospital 
A/B) task. The difference in accuracy provides a measure of the effect of the 
public/private labeling compared to the unlabeled benchmark. 
If motivated by accuracy goals, we would expect respondents to use cognitive 
effort and attention to arrive at a correct answer. While the ratios can be calculated 
and compared by participants, without cognitive reflection, inaccuracy may creep 
in, or the implications of the ratio-based comparison may not be fully processed. 
For example, participants may use the raw figure in the upper-left cell, which indicates 
203 operations without complications (Figure 2). This number suggests more 
successes than failures, looking either row-wise or column-wise: This may lead 
people to choose the top-row hospital as performing best. Instead, arriving at the 
correct decision about comparative performance requires cognitive effort. The ratios 
are not intuitively evident and thus need to be calculated (or estimated) mentally. In 
other words, respondents must detect the covariance in the table, not just compare 
numbers row-wise or column-wise. If motivated by directional goals rather than a 
search for accuracy, we would expect respondents to more readily rely on cues (particularly 
the row labels) in ways that confirm their existing orientation towards the 
issue of performance. In the case of the Danish hospitals, the governance preferences 
about public/private sector are invoked by their description as being public or 
private hospitals, and these are expected to affect accuracy, with pro-public sector 
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preferences being more inaccurate in this case because of the information pointing 
against the public sector hospital performance compared to the private hospital. 
An analogous logic was used in the experiment with US participants but with 
the task presented for insurance policies and the ACA (following the focus on this 
issue by James and Van Ryzin 2017b). The task involved comparison between two 
health insurance plans, the ACA plan in the top row and an employer-provided plan 
(which is the typical private-sector option for most Americans) in the bottom row 
(as shown in Figure 2). As mentioned, the ACA is a public health care policy that 
has been controversial in the US, with evidence of partisan-motivated reasoning in 
consideration of evidence about it (James and Van Ryzin 2017b). The new design 
in this experiment enables partisan-motivated reasoning to be assessed for a task in 
which performance information about outcomes is unambiguous, using the same 
design as for the Danish hospitals but adapted to health insurance in the US. In 
the same way as the Danish hospital experiment (in which the public hospital was 
presented as performing relatively less well than the private), the ACA plan was 
suggested as performing relatively less well than the employer plan. In the US 
experiment, the other “unlabeled” treatment arm of the experiment refers simply to 
insurance plan A in the top row and insurance plan B in the bottom row. 
In the analyses that follow, the main dependent variable of interest is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 for respondents giving the correct answer and 0 for 
respondents giving the wrong answer about the best-performing hospital or health 
insurance plan. Some studies using the covariance detection task randomize the 
rows of the table as well to vary which row represents the correct answer (Kahan 
et al. 2017). However, previous research suggests that randomizing the rows in this 
way has little impact on the overall results in similar contexts (Baekgaard et al. 
2019; Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2016). Given our 3_2 factorial design 
(priming_labeling) in each experiment, and the resulting sample size concerns, we 
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did not randomize the rows in this way. 
In addition to gauging a correct or incorrect choice, we also asked 
participants an additional question about the perceived strength of evidence. 
This measure was newly developed for the current experiments but drew on 
the approach to evidence assessment in the study by James and Van Ryzin 
(2017b). We asked participants the following question: How would you rate the 
information in the table you just saw as evidence about the performance of these 
two health plans [hospitals]? The response scaled ranged from 0¼very weak 
evidence to 10¼very strong evidence. This variable allows us to gauge people’s 
perceptions of the strength of evidence, independent of whether they interpreted 
the information correctly or not. 
For the US study, we used the Qualtrics research panel and gathered data in 
March 2017 from n¼1051 respondents, who were balanced with the US population 
in terms of gender, age, race, income, and region of country. For the Danish 
study, we collected data in January 2017 from n¼3,228 respondents from the 
Danish YouGov panel (balanced with the Danish population in terms of gender, 
age, and municipal residence). 
RESULTS, PART I: THE US STUDY 
Regarding the US study, the analysis focuses on party identification and motivated 
reasoning. The partisan form of motivated reasoning is especially relevant in 
the current context of health care reform and partisan debate in the US. Indeed, 
the US study was conducted online in late March, 2017, when President Trump 
and the Republican-controlled Congress were involved in a concerted effort to 
repeal the ACA, which was especially alarming to Democrats. We run our analysis 
of the effect of labeling the health care performance information (ACA Plan/ 
Employer plan versus Plan A/Plan B) under the three priming conditions (no 
prime, politics prime, and health prime) separately for political party identification. 
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Figures 3 and 4 graphically present the average correct interpretations and the 
rating of evidence strength, by priming condition and party identification, for the 
US study. Table 1 presents the corresponding regressions. 
Beginning with Figure 3, we see that the Democrats under both the no-prime 
control condition and the politics prime are less likely to come to a correct interpretation 
when the performance information is labeled ACA/employer plan. As 
already mentioned, it is interesting to note that the no-prime condition should be 
interpreted against a background of intense political debate and media coverage of 
Republican efforts to repeal the ACA. This perhaps helps explain the similarity in 
results between the no-prime condition and the politics priming condition. Across 
all priming conditions, labeling of the plans as ACA/employer is associated with a 
significant reduction of about 12 percentage points in the rate of correct interpretations 
by Democrats, which is statistically significant (Table 1, Model 1). However, 
when primed to think about their need for and access to health care, the 
Democrats judge the labeled health performance information with greater 
The results for the Republicans, shown in the right panel of Figure 3, show 
that they judge performance information similarly whether labeled as an ACA/ 
employer plan or simply Plan A/B. In other words, the Republicans seem less 
sensitive to the labeling of the performance information, which is perhaps to be 
expected given that their partisan-motivated choice (the employer-provided plan) 
is the correct choice in our experimental design. Interestingly, the Republicans 
appear somewhat more likely to make a correct choice, regardless of labeling, 
when primed to think about their own need for and access to health care. 
Indeed, the health care prime is associated with a statistically significant gain 
of almost 15 percentage points in the rate of correct answers (Table 1, Model 3). 
This finding is also consistent with the notion that a person’s awareness of the 
need for a service enhances accuracy goals. 
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Figure 4 presents the US results for ratings of evidence strength, with the corresponding 
regressions in Table 1. Overall, the experimental effects of both priming 
and labeling on ratings of evidence strength are small and not statistically significant 
(Table 1, Models 5-8). For Democrats in the study, the health prime seems 
to increase their ratings of evidence strength of the labeled information, but 
again this interaction effect is not statistically significant (Table 1, Model 6). For 
Republicans, ratings of evidence strength are largely independent of labeling and 
priming, although the evidence under the no-prime condition and the politics 
priming condition appears to be judged somewhat stronger when labeled as ACA/ 
employer. Again, this could be due to the fact that the evidence favors the 
employer-provided plan over the ACA plan. 
RESULTS, PART II: THE DANISH STUDY 
Denmark is a parliamentary system with multiple parties that are not so easily 
classified into two main parties (as in the US) or clear rival categories (Baekgaard 
2011). Following the original study by Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016), therefore, 
the analysis focuses on governance preferences as measured by the authors’ threeitem 
scale described earlier. In the figures, we make a simple split at the midpoint 
of the scale, as respondents scoring below 50 mostly favor private service provision, 
while respondents scoring above 50 mostly favor public service provision. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the experimental results graphically, while Table 2 presents 
the regressions. 
Beginning with Figure 5, among people who favor the public sector, the labeling 
of information as public/private hospital was associated with lower accuracy 
of interpretation, contrasted with the more neutral hospital A/B comparison. 
This main effect of labeling is statistically significant (Table 2, Model 1). The 
labeling effects are significant within the politics prime and the health-care prime, 
while we do not identify significantly different effects of labeling across priming 
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conditions (Table 2, Model 2). When labeled public/private, participants who 
favor the public sector make less correct interpretations. For the neutral prime, 
the ability to interpret correctly is reduced by almost six percentage points; for 
political and health care prime, by 10-12 percentage points. For those who favor 
the private sector, the labeling of the information has little effect on the correctness 
of interpretations. This finding is consistent with the original finding in 
Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) that labeling matters differently depending on 
governance preferences. 
Although the present experiment is not a direct replication of the 2016 study, it is 
possible to compare the results for the neutral prime of the present study with the 
results of Treatment 1 in the Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) study. In the online 
appendix, Tables A1–A3, we compare the results of the present study with the 2016 
study, broken down by prime. In Table A2, Model 1, we find a negative, marginally 
significant effect of a pro-public governance preference on the likelihood of correct 
interpretation. In the 2016 study (Table 3, Model 1 in Baekgaard and Serritzlew, 
2016), a negative effect (p<0.01) is found. Hence, in both studies, respondents with a 
more favorable view of the public sector make a more biased interpretation when presented 
with information indicating that the private hospital performs best. The results 
are weaker in the present study (an effect of _0.007 compared with _0.019 in the 
2016-study). In the placebo group (Table 3, Model 3 in the 2016 study; Table A2, 
Model 2 in the online appendix), both studies indicate a null effect. The results of 
both studies show that the biased interpretation disappears as expected when neutral 
labeling is used. Finally, the 2016 study shows in an interaction model that the difference 
of the estimate of the effect of pro-public attitudes between the treatment and 
control groups is statistically significant (Table 3, Model 5 in Baekgaard and 
Serritzlew, 2016). In the present study, the difference is smaller and insignificant. 
(Table A2,Model 3 in the online appendix). This reflects the weaker effect of pro-public 
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governance preferences for the treated respondents. In sum, the results of the present 
study are consistent with Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016), although the effects 
are weaker and less securely estimated. Moreover, in accordance with the general 
expectation that political priming increases ideologically motivated reasoning, while 
health priming has a negative impact, Tables A1 and A3 provide evidence of even 
weaker effects in the health care prime condition, while the results are stronger in the 
political prime condition. 
Turning to Figure 6, the Danish results show that participants who favor the 
public sector overall rate the evidence as less strong than those who favor the private 
sector (see also Table 2, Models 5–8). This overall difference in levels appears 
to be independent of the labeling of the performance information. Within the 
group of participants who tend to favor the public sector, the priming effect is significant, 
driven mainly by higher evidence ratings in the health priming condition 
than in the other conditions. Within the group favoring the private sector, both the 
main labeling effect and the political priming effect are statistically significant 
(Table 2, Model 7). When labeled public/private hospital, those who favor the private 
sector consistently judge the performance information as providing stronger 
evidence. As before, this may be due to the fact that the correct interpretation of 
the information supports the conclusion that the private hospital is performing 
best. Figure 6 is helpful in terms of providing an explanation of the priming effects. 
For all respondents, regardless of whether they favor the public or the private 
sector, the politics prime tends to produce less strong evaluations than the other 
conditions. Thus, there is some evidence that political priming—albeit weakly so— 
tends to reduce evidence ratings. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of our two experiments extend knowledge about motivated 
reasoning concerning performance information. In accordance with previous 
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studies, we find that prior beliefs matter for how new information is processed 
and understood. However, we extend these findings to an accuracy-based task 
not previously examined for partisan motivated reasoning and extend findings 
by examining priming of governance preference-based motivated reasoning. 
As a general finding, political priming tends to reduce accuracy and leads to 
ratings of the information as weaker evidence. In contrast, a health care prime 
tends to increase accuracy and leads to ratings of the information as stronger 
evidence. However, the results of the US and Danish experiments also have 
country-specific nuances, which is to be expected since they are undertaken in 
different political contexts. 
In the US context, especially given the highly political period during which the 
study was conducted (as Republicans were on the verge of repealing the ACA), 
Democrats were the participants most clearly influenced by the labeling of the 
performance information, and their biases were only partially mitigated by the 
health care prime. Republicans were less sensitive to the labeling of the performance 
information, and the health care prime enhanced their accuracy in both the 
labeled and unlabeled conditions. The Danish study, however, showed that priming 
matters for the evaluation of evidence strength but had less of an effect on accuracy. 
This result may, at first sight, seem surprising. If respondents find the evidence 
weaker in the political prime compared to the health care prime, why are the 
effects on accuracy limited? One reasonable explanation is that respondents were 
presented with one piece of information, which had only one factually correct 
interpretation. In the political prime, Danish respondents found the evidence 
weaker, but they were not provided with other information and thus had to base 
their evaluation on this information alone. Even if the information may have 
seemed less credible, there was nothing else to base the evaluation on, and, hence, 
there were limited effects for accuracy. This is relevant to further studies of the 
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cognitive process of evaluating information in a political context. It could be particularly 
interesting to study whether a lower evaluation of information strength 
more generally translates into accuracy if there are more pieces of information to 
choose from than just one. 
Adding the neutral no-prime condition provides insight about the question of 
whether the effect of priming is due to politicization or to de-politicization. In the 
US, especially for Democrats at the time of the study, the neutral (no-prime) condition 
appears to be akin to the political priming condition, with clear evidence in 
both cases of partisan-motivated reasoning. Thus, the main change from the status 
quo appears to be the de-politicization associated with the health care prime. In 
the Danish study, we find evidence of both: Compared to the neutral prime, the 
political prime leads to a lower evaluation of evidence strength while the health 
care prime lead to a higher evaluation. However, the effects for accuracy are too 
weak to show a different effect of the two types of primes compared to the neutral 
(no-prime) condition. 
Our findings are also consistent with previous research. First, higher partisanmotivated 
reasoning was evident for politically primed Democrats in the US 
experiment. This is consistent with the earlier findings of James and Van Ryzin 
(2017b) and extends evidence about this form of partisan-political motivated reasoning 
to the domain of the accuracy task of judging unambiguous performance 
information. The influence of prior governance preferences (for public or private 
service provision) was also consistent with the previous study of Baekgaard and 
Serritzlew (2016). Prior governance preferences exerted a negative impact on 
accuracy in the treatment in which public/private labels were used compared to the 
neutral labeling of the organizations being compared. 
The findings show that priming matters to the way performance information is 
interpreted, and motivated reasoning was evident in both experiments, despite important 
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differences in how people in the US and Denmark view health care as a public 
policy. While health care is generally considered a universal right in the Danish political 
system, it is an object of intense political disagreement in the US. An important 
line of future research is to look at citizens being exposed to conflicting statements 
about performance from different political sources. Multiple experiments of this kind 
could be performed on MTurk, given recent research showing the usefulness of this 
source of data to experiments in public management research (Stritch, Pedersen, and 
Taggart 2017). 
Our findings offer insights into potential ways to reduce bias by discouraging 
citizens from thinking in terms of their partisan identities or governance preferences. 
There is a need for more research on the mechanisms at work in these processes. 
Motivated reasoning is probably strongest when the issue is related to 
identity. This insight is consistent with emerging findings that point to the need for 
strategies to protect science communication from antagonistic cultural meanings 
that inhibit rational processing of evidence (Kahan et al. 2017). Additionally, 
future research should consider the forms of cognition that occur during reasoning 
and whether they differ between kinds of motivated reasoning. For example, a 
hypothesis could be that partisan labels are an obvious cue to participants. If 
someone supports party X, they may disregard the achievements of party Y. In 
contrast, ideological reasoning based on thinking about public sector organizations 
may be more engaged and along the lines of avoiding cognitive dissonance. 
However, for some participants, particularly in contexts where there has been 
much discussion of public and private provision of services because of public 
debate about the merits and costs of privatization, the labels may also serve as 
cues. Future empirical studies should seek to tease apart these differences in mechanisms 
and their outcomes for perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. 
Strategies to provide citizens with performance information that they will process 
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accurately can include the use of credible sources of information that users 
trust. In other contexts, an independent source of performance information has 
been found to be an important way of overcoming potential skepticism about the 
information. For example, citizens may be skeptical when public organizations 
report their own good performance, and thus, independent non-governmental sources 
partially counter this problem (James and Van Ryzin 2017a). However, such 
independent sources may not be so effective in cases of deep-seated identity-based 
reasoning that resists this influence. The ACA, in the current highly politically 
charged context in the US, represents an important example in which divergence 
from identity-based reasoning about information could alienate someone from 
their identity-defining group. If instead of relying mainly on sources of information, 
different identities among recipients could alternatively, or additionally, be 
invoked, such a strategy may be able to directly tackle the roots of motivated reasoning. 
The experiments set out here used priming of citizens’ need for health care 
services to make that part of their identity more salient to them prior to considering 
information. In public debate, making some of these shared identities more 
salient may be more effective than providing independent sources of information in 
reducing bias of this kind. In this way, while groups may not be able to agree on 
the ends of public policy, they may be able to move towards more consensus about 
what counts as evidence to inform policy decisions. 
Supplemental data  can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2019.1659891. 
NOTE 
1. Since our study combines the design in Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) with 
the design in James and Van Ryzin (2017b), this section draws heavily and 
sometimes verbatim on these articles in its description of survey questions and 
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